Reading Mr. James Meek’s 7834 word essay is a challenge to The Reader. An essay this long, and complicated, doesn’t have one footnote, so that the quotations can be verified by that Reader. Though speculation is the opening gambit adopted in the first long paragraph, that seems to become his rhetorical mainstay. But these two paragraphs are indicative of Mr. Meek’s - to call it a rhetorical strategy is an utter misnomer. It is more like an historical/political ramble down the path of a History Made To Measure, a popular strategy adopted by Opinion Writers on the mercurial Mr. Putin.
Putin’s Nato obsession reflects a reluctance to distinguish between a bureaucracy and the motives that sustain it. If you abolished Nato, the motives that sustained it would still exist. True, it would have been better if Nato had been abolished when the Soviet Union collapsed. It would have been a magnanimous gesture, and Nato’s early post-Cold War enlargement did smack of triumphalism, and conditionality, and of old militaries flailing around for new roles. But it wouldn’t have abolished America, or the other member states, or their interests, and some version of the basic idea of military alliances and common defence would have lingered in Eastern Europe after Nato had gone, strengthening and weakening according to the politics of those countries and the threat or promise of their neighbours.
A constant that undergirds Putin’s discourse on Nato is his mistaken idea that countries like Ukraine have no politics of their own, that the country wouldn’t have sought to join economic or military associations outside Russia’s purview without being bribed, bullied and tricked into it. In fact, Nato wasn’t particularly popular in Ukraine before 2014. Now more than half the country wants in, because Putin attacked them, and he doesn’t believe their country is real, and although Ukrainians understand Nato isn’t going to help much if he attacks again, the alliance does at least acknowledge that Ukraine exists. In his essay, Putin talks contemptuously about how badly Ukraine has been run since independence (contempt aside, it’s true) and complains about how much money, in the form of cheap gas, Russia gave Ukraine in the decades when the Kremlin still hoped to keep it on a short leash. It all seems rather personal, like the voice of the dominating partner in an abusive relationship.
https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v44/n01/james-meek/did-i-invade-do-you-exist
That a former reporter feigns ignorance of Power Politics, as practiced by the American Hegemon, is not a mistake, but a propaganda strategy. The fact that NATO is mentioned, in this essay 23 times might just be indicative of its importance to Putin, all of Europe , Americans and Mr. Meek as writer? So this essay from the National Security Archive might offer valuable information on ‘Putin’s NATO obsession’ ? This lengthy quotation supplies valuable information to The Reader.
Headline: NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard
Sub-headline: Declassified documents show security assurances against NATO expansion to Soviet leaders from Baker, Bush, Genscher, Kohl, Gates, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Hurd, Major, and Woerner Slavic Studies Panel Addresses “Who Promised What to Whom on NATO Expansion?”
Washington D.C., December 12, 2017 – U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu)
The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.
The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.”
President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (“I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests; but neither Bush nor Gorbachev at that point (or for that matter, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) expected so soon the collapse of East Germany or the speed of German unification.[2]
The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.[3]
This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.
The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990, leading to the crucial February 10, 1990, meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east. The Soviets would need much more time to work with their domestic opinion (and financial aid from the West Germans) before formally signing the deal in September 1990.
The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2)
Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev.
Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)
Afterwards, Baker wrote to Helmut Kohl who would meet with the Soviet leader on the next day, with much of the very same language. Baker reported: “And then I put the following question to him [Gorbachev]. Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position? He answered that the Soviet leadership was giving real thought to all such options [….] He then added, ‘Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable.’” Baker added in parentheses, for Kohl’s benefit, “By implication, NATO in its current zone might be acceptable.” (See Document 8)
Well-briefed by the American secretary of state, the West German chancellor understood a key Soviet bottom line, and assured Gorbachev on February 10, 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” (See Document 9) After this meeting, Kohl could hardly contain his excitement at Gorbachev’s agreement in principle for German unification and, as part of the Helsinki formula that states choose their own alliances, so Germany could choose NATO. Kohl described in his memoirs walking all night around Moscow – but still understanding there was a price still to pay.
All the Western foreign ministers were on board with Genscher, Kohl, and Baker. Next came the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, on April 11, 1990. At this point, the East Germans had voted overwhelmingly for the deutschmark and for rapid unification, in the March 18 elections in which Kohl had surprised almost all observers with a real victory. Kohl’s analyses (first explained to Bush on December 3, 1989) that the GDR’s collapse would open all possibilities, that he had to run to get to the head of the train, that he needed U.S. backing, that unification could happen faster than anyone thought possible – all turned out to be correct. Monetary union would proceed as early as July and the assurances about security kept coming. Hurd reinforced the Baker-Genscher-Kohl message in his meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow, April 11, 1990, saying that Britain clearly “recognized the importance of doing nothing to prejudice Soviet interests and dignity.” (See Document 15)
The Baker conversation with Shevardnadze on May 4, 1990, as Baker described it in his own report to President Bush, most eloquently described what Western leaders were telling Gorbachev exactly at the moment: “I used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure – one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.” (See Document 17)
Baker said it again, directly to Gorbachev on May 18, 1990 in Moscow, giving Gorbachev his “nine points,” which included the transformation of NATO, strengthening European structures, keeping Germany non-nuclear, and taking Soviet security interests into account. Baker started off his remarks, “Before saying a few words about the German issue, I wanted to emphasize that our policies are not aimed at separating Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. We had that policy before. But today we are interested in building a stable Europe, and doing it together with you.” (See Document 18)
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https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
In Mr. Meek’s essay some History is of more value than others: this held aloft by ‘let us suppose’ either enunciated or implied. A History that takes as its subject the Power Politics, as practiced by the American Hegemon, on the World Stage, is of low importance to Mr. Meek’s exhaustingly verbose iteration of Putinology: Here are just two revelatory sentences of Meek’s bloated paragraphs:
At one stage the rhetoric is so detached from reality that I wondered whether, rather than just distorting the truth for political effect, he literally doesn’t know what he’s talking about. He’s a clever man who masters many briefs quickly and well, but there’s only one of him, and as far as we know he’s entirely dependent on secret information for his knowledge of what’s going on.
Mr. Meek draws his inspiration from Hollywood Movies, that draw their plots and characters from the Marvel Comics, or the Star-Wars Universe: the drawback is that the projected Image is seen, and places no demand, like the act of reading places, on the attention of a Reader! To compensate, Mr. Meek just keeps adding characters to his cast to maintain interest. I can’t tell The Reader what a sense of accomplishment that I felt, as I finished the last nine bloated paragraphs of this …
Political Cynic
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January 17, 2022
Headline: Moscow’s sanction-proofing efforts weaken western threats
Sub-headline: While Russia has stress-tested its economy and built up reserves, Europe has not reduced its energy dependence
Russia’s efforts to reduce its reliance on the global financial system have made it better prepared to weather the sanctions that the US and Europe have warned would follow a new attack on Ukraine.
The relative success of what investors have called Moscow’s “Fortress Russia” strategy is likely to make western threats less of a deterrent, analysts say. Meanwhile, the EU has not weaned itself off Russian gas, making any restrictions on Russian energy exports potentially self-damaging — and leaving the possibility for Moscow to retaliate by limiting supplies.
The western sanctions under discussion could go far beyond those passed following Russia’s annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in 2014. They could ape punitive measures used against Iran and North Korea that all but cut the countries off from the global economy.
But Russia’s finance ministry, which has stress-tested worst-case scenarios for years and set up a unit working to counter possible measures from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, says Russia’s economy could withstand even those types of measures.
“Obviously, it’s unpleasant, but it’s do-able. I think our financial institutions can handle it [if] these risks emerge,” finance minister Anton Siluanov said last week.
The possibility of Russian aggression against Ukraine and subsequent financial retaliation from the US and Europe has increased after talks in Geneva and Brussels to defuse tensions were deemed “unsuccessful” by the Kremlin last week.
Russian president Vladimir Putin has deployed more than 100,000 troops along the Ukrainian border and threatened military action unless the west meets a series of security demands.
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https://www.ft.com/content/a2eaba73-cec8-4a0f-b991-7de558bb0ee1