The Reliable American Foreign Policy conformist Richard Haass opines in the pages of @FT: on the evolving Israeli, Iran conflict.
Political Observer comments.
Political Observer offers a collection of Richard Haass’ reiterated, regurgitated Foreign Policy bromides, as if such can offer insights, of either of the actors in this evolving conflict!
The topic sentences are the beginning point:
On Saturday, Iran launched a barrage of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles at Israel from sites in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
While the attack failed, it nevertheless crossed a line. It was the first strike on Israel that came from Iran itself and was conducted by its military.
Presumably the strike was meant to deter future Israeli attacks and to send a message that Israel could no longer target senior Iranian military leaders with impunity.
The big question is where Israel and indeed the entire Middle East goes from here.
The Biden administration has reportedly advised the Israelis to “take the win” in the aftermath of its successful air defence effort.
Editor: those topic sentences expand and contract at will
Broadly speaking, Israel’s options are as follows: do nothing; return to the status quo ante of waging an indirect war against Iran; carry out a limited strike against military targets inside Iran associated with the attack; or carry out a large reprisal, including against known Iranian nuclear sites.
At the time of writing, Israel still has considerable room for choice as to what it does and when, something it would not have had if the attack had killed a significant number of Israelis or destroyed valuable military targets.
Doing nothing or even returning to the previous indirect war has upsides. It allows Israel to focus on Gaza and the return of its hostages, prevents a wider war along with its economic, military and human costs, placates the Americans, and avoids an action that would further normalise homeland on homeland attacks.
For this reason, holding back will not satisfy those Israelis inside and outside the government whose priority is to restore deterrence.
Such attacks, though, run the risk of inviting further Iranian strikes on Israel and prompting Tehran to accelerate its nuclear programme in the belief that having nuclear weapons would deter the Israelis from future attacks on Iranian territory.
Meanwhile, attacking known nuclear sites in Iran would be widely seen as a major escalation and again put Israel on the defensive.
The least bad, and most likely, choices for Israel are either resuming the indirect war against Iran or carrying out a limited strike against military targets inside the country.
Regardless of Israel’s next move, short of a change in regime in Tehran, something beyond the ability of either Israel or the west to bring about, there is no way to solve the strategic challenge Iran poses.
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Richard Haass has no military experience, and a dismal record of political conformity:
U.S. Options in Confronting Iraq
Richard N. Haass
February 25, 1998
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What should be done? For the immediate future, we should take advantage of the fact that U.S. military presence in the Gulf region is at a post-Desert Storm high. The United States should test Saddam’s willingness to live up to his latest agreement. This requires UNSCOM and the IAEA undertaking an aggressive series of inspections. Any frustration of international inspectors should be met with a robust military response. No more warnings are required or warranted.
Any materials associated with weapons of mass destruction that are uncovered by UNSCOM, the IAEA, or the newly configured “Special Group” should be destroyed or rendered harmless. This said, it is quite possible that inspectors will find nothing given that Saddam Hussein has now had an additional four months to conceal production capabilities, weapons, or both. Thus, even a clean bill of health from the United Nations would not constitute a guarantee that Saddam possessed no weapons of mass destruction. Nor would it preclude his threatening his neighbors with conventional military attack or terrorism or violating any of his many other commitments. As a result, the question arises: What should constitute the long-term policy of the United States toward Saddam Hussein and Iraq?
There are two very different paths to choose from, keeping in mind that there are variations of each. One approach—”roll-back”—would seek to bring about Saddam Hussein’s removal from power, be it by assassination, providing support to Iraqi opposition elements, or by taking control of the country. The second approach available to the United States can best be described as containment.
The case for roll-back is straightforward, namely, that containing Saddam is likely to prove difficult, eliminating his weapons of mass destruction virtually impossible. In principle, roll-back solves the problem of contemporary Iraq by getting rid of the person who is at its core.
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https://www.brookings.edu/articles/u-s-options-in-confronting-iraq/
Political Observer